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Sinkholes and "Substantial Rights": North Carolina's




In the summer of 2002, after a heavy rainstorm, the town of
Hickory, North Carolina, made national news when a massive sinkhole
opened up in the parking lot of a local restaurant, swallowing a car-a
Corvette, no less-in the process.' A few days later, a local radio
broadcaster commented on the air that his investigation had revealed that
a local grading company had done the drainage work on the parking lot,
2
work that likely caused the sinkhole. Unfortunately for the broadcaster,
the company in question had, in fact, not done any drainage work on the
lot.3  Even worse, the mother of the owner of the grading company
,4happened to be listening to the radio show that morning.
The resulting defamation suit wandered through the North
Carolina court system for the next four years. It eventually reached the
North Carolina Supreme Court,5 before being sent back to the trial court.6
For broadcasters and journalists, what began as an interesting news story
ended with the North Carolina Court of Appeals having washed away
significant First Amendment protections for commentary on issues of
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2008.
1. Greg Lacour, Restaurant owner losing battle against sinkholes - Saturday's
downpour in Hickory burst pipe under parking lot, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 20,
2002, at 2B.




5. Neill Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 616 S.E.2d 541, 542 (N.C. 2005)
(granting petition for discretionary review).
6. Neill Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 622 S.E.2d 490, 490 (N.C. 2005)
(dismissing petition for discretionary review as "improvidently allowed").
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public concern. 7 More importantly, the case spotlighted what continues
to be a badly splintered area of law nationally-the availability of
8interlocutory appeals in defamation cases.
In Neill Grading v. Lingafelt,9 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals made two key holdings: (1) in defamation claims involving
plaintiffs who are private individuals and commentary on an issue of
public concern, North Carolina law requires only that plaintiffs show
negligence on the part of the defendant;10 and (2) given the newly-minted
negligence standard of fault, there was no substantial constitutional right
at issue for the defendant that would justify an interlocutory appeal of the
trial court's denial of summary judgment.1" The decision in Neill
Grading seemed to confirm an increasing reluctance on the part of North
Carolina courts to allow defendants in defamation cases to avoid a full
trial, even when the evidence seems weak at best. In fact, between
September 2002 and May 2005, the Court of Appeals took appeals in
five defamation cases and ruled against the defendant every time.12 In
four of the five cases, the Court of Appeals dismissed interlocutory
appeals arising from denials of summary judgment or motions to dismiss
because, the court said, no substantial right was at issue.
13
7. Neill Grading, 606 S.E.2d at 742.
8. Interlocutory appeals seek review of a judicial order or decision made
before final judgment. See infra Part I.
9. 606 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
10. Id. at 741.
11. Id. at 742.
12. See Grant v. Miller, 611 S.E.2d 477 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing
defendant's appeal of trial court's refusal to grant a motion to dismiss in a claim
arising from an advertisement in a congressional election campaign); Boyce & Isley,
PLLC v. Cooper, 611 S.E.2d 175 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing appeal of the
trial court's denial, on remand, of a motion for judgment on the pleadings); Neill
Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 606 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(dismissing an interlocutory appeal of trial court's denial of summary judgment in a
defamation claim); Priest v. Sobeck, 571 S.E.2d 75 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 579
S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 2003) (dismissing as interlocutory union's appeal of partial denial
of summary judgment in a defamation claim arising from statements made in union
newsletter); Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(reversing trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss defamation claim
involving a political ad in the statewide race for Attorney General).
13. The only exception is the first Boyce & Isley decision, 568 S.E.2d 893
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002). For a fuller discussion and critique of this decision by one of
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This series of decisions would seem, on its face, to be evidence
of consistent, settled law. In fact, it is just the opposite. Following the
Court of Appeals' decision in the second case in this series, Priest v.
Sobeck,14 the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals, indicating that it had a different view of interlocutory appeals in15
defamation cases. The Court of Appeals' dissent in Priest, adopted in
its entirety by the Supreme Court, reasoned that an interlocutory appeal
of the partial denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment was
proper because the trial court's ruling, if wrong, "would have a chilling
effect on [defendants'] rights of free speech."' 16  While the Supreme
Court's ruling would seem to have carved out a clear right to
interlocutory appeal when First Amendment rights are at issue, in the
three years since that ruling the Court of Appeals has effectively
eviscerated the Supreme Court's holding.
This is not just an issue in North Carolina. Across the country,
states continue to struggle to reconcile their interests in efficiently
moving cases through the judicial system and in protecting speech from
the potential chilling effect of spurious defamation claims. 17 While many
other states have crafted solutions that err on the side of protecting First
Amendment rights, 18 North Carolina, it seems, has chosen a different
path.
This Note will argue that North Carolina's approach to this
problem, an approach first seen in Neill Grading and confirmed in Boyce
19 20& Isley, PLLC v. Cooper19 (Boyce & Isley II) and Grant v. Miller, fails
North Carolina's preeminent First Amendment attorneys, see Hugh Stevens, Boyce
& Isley, PLLC v. Cooper and the Confusion of North Carolina Libel Law, 82 N.C.
L. REv. 2017 (2004). See also William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the
First Amendment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 285 (2004) (analyzing constitutional issues
raised by regulations concerning false campaign speech).
14. 571 S.E.2d 75 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 579 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 2003).
15. Priest, 579 S.E.2d at 250 (adopting in its entirety Judge Greene's dissent in
the Court of Appeals decision).
16. Priest, 571 S.E.2d at 81 (Greene, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
17. See generally Media Libel Law 2005-06, Medial Law Resource Center 50-
State Survey, 2005 (surveying state statutory and case law on various aspects of
defamation claims, including availability of interlocutory appeals).
18. See infra Part V.
19. 611 S.E.2d 175 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
to adequately acknowledge United States Supreme Court precedent on
the scope of First Amendment and procedural protections for free speech
and a free press. The result in North Carolina, and other states with a
similar view, is that defendants in defamation cases face the risk of
having their voices quieted by the fear of protracted and expensive
litigation, no matter how weak the claim might be. Part I of this Note
examines the availability of interlocutory appeals in North Carolina, both
generally and, more specifically, in cases involving the First
Amendment. Part II outlines the speech-chilling burdens imposed on
defendants by deficient defamation claims, especially in light of frequent
errors by judges and juries at the trial level. Part III traces United States
Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence and the implications it has for
courts deciding whether to grant an interlocutory appeal. Part III also
examines how the Supreme Court has struck the balance -between
adherence to procedural rules and protection of First Amendment rights.
Part IV critically analyzes the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision
in Neill Grading in light of both Priest and United States Supreme Court
precedents. Part V examines how other states have addressed the issue
of interlocutory appeals in defamation cases. This Note concludes by
assessing the alternative frameworks and calling for an approach to
interlocutory appeals that more faithfully adheres to the First
Amendment values outlined by the United States Supreme Court without
unduly delaying legitimate litigation with unnecessary appeals.
I. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS IN NORTH CAROLINA-THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS DOCTRINE
An interlocutory appeal is any "appeal that occurs before the trial
court's final ruling on the entire case." 21 These appeals can address
either "legal points necessary to the determination of the case" or issues
20. 611 S.E.2d 477 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). Like Boyce & Isley II, Miller
involved a defamation claim arising from a political ad run during an election
campaign. In both cases, the loser of the election brought the claim.
21. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 106 (8th ed. 2004). See also Veazey v. City of
Durham, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (N.C. 1950) ("An interlocutory order is one made
during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it
for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire
controversy.").
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"wholly separate from the merits of the action. 22  To be sure, as a
general principle, interlocutory appeals in North Carolina and most other
jurisdictions are a disfavored action. As North Carolina Supreme Court
Justice Ervin said in the landmark interlocutory appeal case, Veazey v.
City of Durham: "There is no more effective way to procrastinate the
administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court
piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate
orders. ' 24 In short, if parties were allowed to immediately appeal every
decision made by a trial court, the judicial system might well grind to a
screeching halt.
A. Defining "Substantial Rights"
Before there were statutory provisions dealing with interlocutory
appeals, the common law rule in North Carolina was that interlocutory
appeals were not allowed unless delaying "the appeal until final
judgment would result in an absolute loss of the right, or unavoidable
prejudice to it."'25 In the 1883 case Jones v. Call, the North Carolina
Supreme Court acknowledged that "[n]o rule has yet been settled
classifying such cases, and perhaps it would be unwise to undertake to
settle a rule definitely at this time. 2 6  Over time, however, state
legislatures and the federal government did attempt to "settle a rule," by
passing statutes defining, and strictly limiting, when parties can appeal
interlocutory orders. 27  North Carolina currently has two statutory
22. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 106.
23. See, e.g., Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (N.C. 1990)
("Generally there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and
judgments."); Veazey, 57 S.E.2d at 382-83 (holding that the Superior Court retains
jurisdiction of a case while a party appeals an interlocutory order to the North
Carolina Supreme Court); Jones v. Call, 89 N.C. 188, 189 (1883) ("An action might
easily be protracted indefinitely, if an appeal could be taken at once from every order
or judgment, however unimportant or inconclusive ...."); Moose v. Nissan of
Statesville, Inc., 444 S.E.2d 694 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (denying an interlocutory
appeal of the trial court's order denying punitive damages).
24. Veazey, 57 S.E.2d at 382.
25. Jones, 89 N.C. at 190.
26. Id. (alteration added).
27. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (2005).
The federal statute only allows interlocutory appeals in civil actions when the district
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provisions that address appeals of interlocutory judgments. The first
28provision, which is in the rules of civil procedure, says that:
An appeal may be taken from every judicial order
or determination of a judge of a superior or district
court, upon or involving a matter of law or legal
inference, whether made in or out of session, which
affects a substantial right claimed in any action or
proceeding; or which in effect determines the
action, and prevents a judgment from which an
appeal might be taken; or discontinues the action,
29
or grants or refuses a new trial.
The second provision, found in the section outlining the
administration of the courts, adopts similar language. It allows for an
appeal:
From any interlocutory order or judgment of a
superior court or district court in a civil action or
proceeding which (1) Affects a substantial right, or
(2) In effect determines the action and prevents a
judgment from which appeal might be taken, or (3)
Discontinues the action, or (4) Grants or refuses a
new trial, appeal lies of right directly to the Court
of Appeals.30
Both statutes make clear that in the absence of a final judgment
by the trial court,31 an interlocutory appeal is only available if a
"substantial right" is affected.
court judge certifies that the interlocutory "order involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation ... " 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
28. For a fuller discussion of the legislative history of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277,
see Oestreicher v. Am. Nat'l. Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 801 (N.C. 1976) (granting
interlocutory appeal in a contract dispute).
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277(a) (2005).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(d) (2005).
31. There is an enormous body of research and case law on what exactly
constitutes a final order or judgment. See 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 82-84
(2006). In North Carolina, this provision is typically invoked for appeals of the
granting of either summary judgment or a Rule 12 motion to dismiss. Though these
are not technically "final judgments," the statute allows an interlocutory appeal
[Vol. 5310
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However, the statutes themselves do not define what exactly a
"substantial right" is, leaving it instead to the courts to create a
definition.32 The problem for North Carolina courts is that the test that
has emerged of what makes a substantial right is "more easily stated than
applied., 33 Typically courts do not actually address the question of what
makes a right substantial or not, but rather "merely state that a right is or
is not substantial. 34 One court, relying on Webster's Dictionary, defined
a substantial right as "a legal right affecting or involving a matter of
substance as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially
affecting those interests which a man is entitled to have preserved and
protected by law: a material right., 35 Most courts that do specifically
analyze whether a right is substantial have opted for a deceptively simple
two-part test. Under this formulation, for an appeal based on a
substantial right to be valid, (1) "the right itself must be substantial, 36
and (2) "the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work
injury... if not corrected before appeal from final judgment." 37
To summarize, the definition of a "substantial right," it seems, is
a right that is substantial and subject to deprivation if not corrected on
appeal. This seemingly circular test has the benefit for the courts of
giving them vast discretion to choose which appeals they want to hear.
The downside, however, is that many parties today have no clearer idea
of when an interlocutory appeal might be granted than did the parties in
38Jones v. Call some 124 years ago. Occasionally, the substantial nature
of the right, and therefore the appropriateness of the interlocutory appeal,
because otherwise the losing party would have no recourse. See Willis P. Whichard,
Appealability in North Carolina: Common Law Definition of the Statutory
Substantial Right Doctrine, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 3, 123, 126 (1984)
(surveying North Carolina appellate decisions on interlocutory appeals).
32. Whichard, supra note 31, at 125.
33. Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 392 S.E.2d 735, 738 (N.C. 1990) (Meyer,
J., dissenting).
34. Whichard, supra note 31, at 130.
35. Oestreicher v. Am. Nat'l. Stores, Inc., 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (N.C. 1976)
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1971)).
36. Goldston, 392 S.E.2d at 736.
37. Id. (alteration added). See also Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 S.E.2d 377,
381 (N.C. 1950) (holding that appeal of an interlocutory order did not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction).
38. 89 N.C. 188 (1883).
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is clear-like, for example, when an interlocutory order allows a sheriff
to rummage through the defendant's safe. 39 Most cases are less clear
cut.
40
In 1984, Willis P. Whichard,4' then an associate judge on the
North Carolina Court of Appeals and later an associate justice on the
North Carolina Supreme Court, examined the development of the
"substantial right doctrine" in North Carolina.42 Justice Whichard argued
that the flexible nature of the substantial rights inquiry employed by
courts had resulted in "a disorganized display of case law.",43 Courts,
Justice Whichard said, were deciding whether an interlocutory judgment
affected a substantial right "on an almost ad hoc basis" animated more by
the desire to "reach an equitable disposition in the individual case than
• • , ,,44
by the coherent application of consistent legal principles. The courts'
most recent substantial rights decisions, at least in the defamation arena,
only bolster Justice Whichard's observation.
B. The Intersection of Substantial Rights and the First Amendment
Setting aside for the moment the actual definition of what makes
a "substantial right" under North Carolina law, it can hardly be doubted
that most people would count freedom of speech and freedom of the
press as two of their "substantial rights." In the area of free speech, until
recently at least, it seemed that North Carolina courts agreed. In Kaplan
v. Prolife Action League,45 decided in 1993, the Court of Appeals granted
an interlocutory appeal of a preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court restricting an anti-abortion group from protesting in front of the
39. Whichard, supra note 31, at 152-53 (citing Hooks v. Flowers, 101 S.E.2d
320 (N.C. 1958)).
40. See generally Whichard, supra note 31. Whichard's work was updated in
1995 by J. Brad Donovan, a staff member at the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
See J. Brad Donovan, The Substantial Right Doctrine and Interlocutory Appeals, 17
CAMPBELL L. REv. 71 (1995).
41. John Stevenson, Whichard: Appointment as Dean 'Right Exciting,'
HERALD-SUN (Durham), Feb. 26, 1999, at C3.
42. Whichard, supra note 31.
43. Id. at 125.
44. Id.
45. 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 436 S.E.2d 379 (N.C.
1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1253 (1994).
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plaintiff's house.46 The court in Kaplan said that "given the important
First Amendment principles at issue, substantial rights of the defendants
have been affected., 47 Five years later, in Sherrill v. Amerada Hess
Corp.,48 the Court of Appeals again granted an interlocutory appeal of a
gag order imposed by the trial judge on all parties involved with the49
case. Citing Kaplan, the court said flatly that "[a]n order implicating a
party's First Amendment rights affects a substantial right., 50 It should be
noted that both of these cases involved prior restraints on speech as a
result of the trial courts' actions,51 and therefore draw much closer
52
scrutiny from appellate courts.
Until Priest, however, North Carolina courts had not had the
occasion to rule on whether the substantial rights doctrine truly applied
to all First Amendment cases or whether the court's analyses in Kaplan
and Sherrill were limited to cases of prior restraint. In Priest, the
plaintiffs charged that a newsletter produced by their local union and its
district representative libeled them by implying that they had been
responsible for the hiring of non-union workers.53 The trial court granted
only partial summary judgment to the defendants and certified the case
for immediate appellate review under the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. 54 The Court of Appeals held that partial denial of summary
judgment was not a final judgment, and therefore could not be
immediately appealed unless a substantial right was affected.55 The court
went on to distinguish this case from Kaplan and Sherrill, pointing out
46. Id. at 832.
47. Id. at 834 (alteration added) (citing Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976)).
48. 504 S.E.2d 802 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
49. Id. at 806-07.
50. Id. at 807 (alteration added) (citing Kaplan, 431 S.E.2d at 834).
51. See Priest v. Sobeck, 571 S.E.2d 75, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (denying
interlocutory appeal because no substantial right was affected by trial court's partial
denial of summary judgment), rev'd, 579 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 2003).
52. Cf Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) ("In determining the
extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally,
considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints
upon publication.").
53. Priest, 571 S.E.2d at 76-77.
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-1A, Rule 54(b) (2005).
55. Priest, 571 S.E.2d at 78-79.
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that those cases involved prior restraints, whereas here "the trial court did
,56
not impose any preliminary restrictions upon the parties. '  The court
also found defendants' claims of a potential chilling effect unavailing,
saying that, "[a]ny change in defendants' behavior because of this case is
self-imposed.,
57
In his dissent, Judge Greene disagreed with both parts of the
majority's holding. He argued that the trial court's partial dismissal of
summary judgment was indeed an appealable final order, and, in any
case, that the partial dismissal did affect a substantial right.5s  In
particular, Judge Greene said, the fact that the trial court may have
misapplied the fault standard outlined by the United States Supreme
Court in the landmark libel case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan59
"would have a chilling effect on [defendants'] rights of free speech. 60
Unfortunately, Judge Greene's dissent was not extensive. In fact, the
portion dealing with the substantial right doctrine is four sentences
long.6' As a result, six months later, when the North Carolina Supreme
56. Id. at 79.
57. Id. (alteration added).
58. Id. at 81 (Greene, J., dissenting).
59. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court in that case required public official
plaintiffs in defamation cases to prove "actual malice" by the defendant, meaning
that the defendant either knew the statement in question was false or printed it with
"reckless disregard" for the truth. Id. at 279-80. The defendants in Priest argued
that the Court had extended the "actual malice" fault standard to the labor union
context in Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53
(1966). The majority in Priest rejected that assertion, citing instead Old Domihion
Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
60. Priest, 571 S.E.2d at 81 (Greene, J., dissenting) (alteration added).
61. The full text of that portion of Judge Greene's dissent, adopted by the
Supreme Court, reads:
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that partial
denial of defendants' summary judgment motion did not
affect a substantial right. Defendants contend the trial
court misapplied the New York Times v. Sullivan "actual
malice" standard, infringing on their First Amendment
right to free speech. Because misapplication of the
actual malice standard, detrimental to defendants, would
have a chilling effect on their rights of free speech, the
trial court's order does affect a substantial right.
Accordingly, this Court should also address the merits
of defendants' appeal.
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Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, adopting Judge Greene's
dissent, observers were given precious little guidance on the intersection
62
of substantial rights and the First Amendment. The per curiam decision
did not indicate whether the court was reversing the Court of Appeals'
decision that there was no final judgment, its decision that no substantial
right was at issue, or both. Even assuming the court was reversing the
substantial rights holding, the court left observers wondering whether it
disagreed with the Court of Appeals' reading of the limits of Kaplan and
Sherrill or whether it found the labor union context in Priest to be
dispositive. Those questions aside, however, the reversal at least hinted
that the court agreed with Judge Greene that there need not be a prior
restraint to implicate a substantial right; rather, even the potential that a
trial court ruling might chill First Amendment speech made an
63interlocutory appeal appropriate.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIEST
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Priest had
potentially huge implications for media defendants in defamation cases.
Defamation claims are incredibly expensive to defend for media
64defendants. As Professor Susan Gilles has pointed out, cost estimates
range from $95,000 all the way up to $400,000, 65 not including the time
that editors and reporters must spend dealing with the suit.66 These
Id. (citation omitted).
62. Priest v. Sobeck, 579 S.E.2d 250, 250 (N.C. 2003).
63. Id.
64. See Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An
Analysis of Process in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1780 n.95 (1998)
(arguing that the United States Supreme Court has overemphasized accuracy in its
defamation jurisprudence at the expense of efficiency and quick disposal of deficient
claims). See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Clash of a Judge and a Small Paper
Underlines the Tangled History of Defamation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at C4
(discussing defamation claim made by a judge against a local newspaper resulting in
$7 million award); Patricia A. Thompson-Hill, Note, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders: "Matters of Private Concern" Give Libel Defendants Lowered
First Amendment Protection, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 883, 885 n.8 (1986) (discussing
famous defamation trial involving CBS and General William Westmoreland).
65. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1780 n.95.
66. Id. at 1780-81.
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estimates do not take into account the damage to reputation that
journalists suffer when they are forced to defend high-profile defamation
suits.
67
More importantly, statistics show that most defamation cases are
legally deficient from the beginning, and even those cases that result in
pro-plaintiff verdicts at trial are overwhelmingly reversed on appeal.68
According to Gilles, more than seventy percent of pro-plaintiff verdicts
that are appealed are "disturbed" by the appellate court, and more than
forty percent of those are outright reversals. 69 In 2001, the Media Law
Resource Center published a comprehensive study of summary judgment
decisions in libel cases from 1997 to 2000.70 During those four years, the
study found that more than three-quarters of all libel claims in state and
federal courts against media defendants resulted in summary judgment
71for the defendant. Where defendants appealed a denial of summary
judgment-and the court granted an interlocutory appeal-the trial court
decision was reversed and dismissed by the appellate court nearly
72seventy-five percent of the time. The point of these statistics, Gilles
argues, is that given the extraordinarily high error rate in libel cases, the
more quickly these claims can be heard by an appellate tribunal the
better.73 Without an avenue for interlocutory appeal, all of those
defendants would have been forced to proceed to a full trial before
getting a favorable verdict.
Not only is this a waste of judicial resources, it can be
economically prohibitive for small-town journalists like the defendant in
67. Cf Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (applying the
"actual malice" standard in a suit involving speech on an issue of public concern
because to apply a lower fault standard would "create a strong impetus toward self-
censorship").
68. See generally Gilles, supra note 64.
69. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1781 (citing 10 Years of Appellate Review in
Defamation Cases from Bose to Connaughton to the Present, Libel Defense
Resource Council Bulletin No. 2 (April 1994)).
70. 2001 Summary Judgment Study and Supreme Court Report-2000 Term,
Libel Defense Resource Center Bulletin No. 3 (August 2001) [hereinafter LDRC
Bulletin].
71. Id. at 37.
72. Id. at 20.
73. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1798.
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Neill Grading.74 Unless the claim is dismissed early, these defendants
are left with just a handful of expensive, potentially debilitating options.
They can either go to trial with the understanding that an eventual appeal
and remand may be necessary, go to trial and hope that no appeal is
needed, or settle. Defendants in this situation will surely be much more
reluctant to comment on any important issue when they know the sword
of Damocles hangs over their heads.75 The North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in Priest seemed to recognize this. By acknowledging
that the denial of summary judgment in a case with First Amendment
implications does constitute a potential infringement of a substantial
right, the court seemed to give defendants another crack at disposing of
the claims against them before being forced to go to trial.76
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT FOR PRIEST
The North Carolina Supreme Court's substantial rights holding
in Priest is well-supported by more than forty years of United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the intersection of First Amendment
rights and state defamation law. While interlocutory appeals in state
court cases are purely a statutory matter, the Supreme Court has
consistently highlighted the fundamental nature of First Amendment
rights and the danger to those rights that comes with exposing defendants
to frivolous and expensive defamation trials." In addition, the Court has
made clear in other contexts that where First Amendment rights are at
issue, the demands of the Rules of Civil Procedure must not overrun
constitutional concerns.
74. Id. at 1780.
75. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971)
("The very possibility of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted
process, is threat enough to cause discussion and debate to steer far wider of the
unlawful zone .... ") (internal quotation and citation omitted).
76. Priest v. Sobeck, 579 S.E.2d 250, 250 (N.C. 2003).
77. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50 (holding that defendants' fear of an
erroneous verdict in a defamation case "would create a strong impetus toward self-
censorship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate"); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasizing the country's "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open").
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A. United States Supreme Court Defamation Jurisprudence
Any discussion of American defamation law must begin with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. New York Times involved a
defamation claim by a city commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama,
against both the New York Times and civil rights activists who had
purchased an ad in the paper criticizing the actions of Montgomery city
officials. 79 A trial court in Alabama awarded the plaintiff $500,000 in
damages, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, based on several
inaccuracies in the text of the advertisement.80 The Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, resoundingly rejected the notion that states
could, through their defamation laws, punish speakers who comment on
the conduct of public officials simply because the speakers made a
81
mistake or got a fact wrong. Instead the Court said, it "consider[ed]
this case against the backdrop of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
• ,,82
wide-open. Given this principle, "erroneous statements" must be
expected "if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space'
that they 'need[] to survive."'' 83 To ensure that "breathing space," the
Court held that the First Amendment required that in order to recover
damages, public official plaintiffs in defamation suits must prove with
"convincing clarity ' '84  that the false "statement was made
with... knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."85 Otherwise, the Court said, "would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism.., because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear
of the expense of having to do so."
86
78. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
79. Id. at 256.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 292.
82. Id. at 270 (alterations added).
83. Id. at 271-72 (alteration added) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
84. Id. at 285-86.
85. Id. at 279-80.
86. Id. at 279 (alteration added).
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Seven years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,87 a
plurality of the Court extended New York Times to cover commentary on
any issue "of public or general interest," whether the plaintiff is a public
figure or not.88 The Court said, "We honor the commitment to robust
debate on public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by
extending constitutional protection to all discussion and communication
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether
the persons involved are famous or anonymous." 89 In that opinion, the
Court also offered its clearest statement yet as to the dangers that
defamation laws that set a negligence standard pose for the First
Amendment. The Court said:
In libel cases, however, we view an erroneous
verdict for the plaintiff as most serious. Not only
does it mulct the defendant for an innocent
misstatement-the three-quarter-million-dollar jury
verdict in this case could rest on such an error-but
the possibility of such error, even beyond the
vagueness of the negligence standard itself, would
create a strong impetus toward self-censorship,
which the First Amendment cannot tolerate. 90
Rosenbloom, however, did not last. Just three years later, in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,9I another case involving a private-figure
plaintiff, the Court muddied the waters considerably. In Gertz, the Court
held that the Rosenbloom extension of New York Times to all
commentary on issues of public concern failed to "recognize[] the
strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private
individuals for wrongful injury to reputation.",92 Instead, the Court said,
states should be able to define for themselves the appropriate standard of
fault that a private figure plaintiff must prove, "so long as they do not
impose liability without fault., 93 The Court did hold, however, that to
award "presumed or punitive damages," the plaintiff must meet the
87. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
88. Id. at 43-44.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 50.
91. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
92. Id. at 348 (alteration added).
93. Id. at 347.
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"actual malice" standard. 94 In dissent, Justice Brennan, author of both
New York Times and the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom, reiterated the
concerns he outlined in both cases about the chilling effect a negligence
95
standard would have on speech concerning public issues.96 Brennan
wrote:
Adoption, by many States, of a reasonable-care
standard in cases where private individuals are
involved in matters of public interest-the probable
result of today's decision-will likewise lead to
self-censorship since publishers will be required
carefully to weigh a myriad of uncertain factors
before publication. The reasonable-care standard is
"elusive," it saddles the press with "the intolerable
burden of guessing how a jury might assess the
reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the
accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or
portrait. '
98In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., a case
involving a private-figure plaintiff and speech that was not about an issue
of public concern, the Court confirmed that, "[i]t is speech on 'matters of
public concern' that is 'at the heart of First Amendment protection."'
99
Finally, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., v. Hepps,100 another
case involving a private-figure plaintiff and an issue of public concern,
the Court held that a state defamation statute that placed the burden of
proof on the defendant to prove the truth of his statements was
unconstitutional.101 Coming as it did at the end of a veritable flurry of
Supreme Court defamation cases, the language employed by Justice
94. Id. at 348-49.
95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 1061 (defining negligence as
the "failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would
have exercised in a similar situation").
96. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
98. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
99. Id. at 758-59 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776 (1978)) (citation omitted) (alteration added).
100. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
101. Id. at 776.
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O'Connor in crafting this holding is illustrative, especially in light of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals' holding in Neill Grading. She wrote:
When the speech is of public concern but the
plaintiff is a private figure, as in Gertz, the
Constitution still supplants the standards of the
common law, but the constitutional requirements
are, in at least some of their range, less forbidding
than when the plaintiff is a public figure and the
speech is of public concern.102
More specifically, Justice O'Connor said, in cases involving
private plaintiffs and speech on issues of public concern, "where the
scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe that the Constitution
requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech."
' 03
The foregoing line. of cases can be summarized by a few key
principles. Chief among these is that the Court has drawn a clear
constitutional line between speech on issues of public concern and
speech on private issues. The Court has repeatedly confirmed from New
York Times to Hepps that when the speech in question deals with an issue
of public concern, "the Constitution still supplants the common law,"
meaning that the Constitution requires states to set the standard of fault
at least at negligence. 104 Speech that does not address an issue of public• 105
concern warrants far less federal constitutional protection. Related to
this core principle is the Court's belief that the constitutional standard,
rather than a common-law standard, has two key benefits for First
Amendment speech: (1) it protects speakers on issues of public concern
from being punished for their speech solely on the basis of minor
102. Id. at 775 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 776.
104. Id. at 775 (alteration added). This point tends to be confusing because
negligence jurisprudence is usually thought of as a state common-law issue. The
point the Court is making is not that the Constitution supplants the common law of
negligence but rather that insofar as the state common law of defamation requires
something less than negligence for issues of public concern it is unconstitutional.
Put another way, the Constitution requires at least a negligence standard of fault for
issues of public concern, no matter what the state common law standard might
previously have been.
105. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 758 (1985) ("We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First
Amendment importance.").
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mistakes or fact errors, 106 and (2) it discourages lengthy and expensive
defamation trials that inevitably work to chill protected speech. 1
07
B. Reconciling Procedural and First Amendment Demands
In a separate but related line of cases, the Supreme Court has
confirmed its fundamental concerns about the chilling effect of
defamation litigation on protected speech. In these cases, the Court has
at least indicated that where First Amendment rights collide with rules of
civil procedure designed to promote judicial efficiency, First
Amendment rights should prevail. Though these cases are not at the
heart of defamation jurisprudence, they do provide guidance on how to
balance the protection of fundamental free speech rights with courts'
interest in administering justice efficiently.
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,08
which involved a defamation action by a stereo equipment maker against
a magazine that negatively reviewed one of the company's products, the
Court was presented with the question of whether the proper standard of
appellate review in defamation cases is set by the Rules of Civil
Procedure or by the Constitution.109  More specifically, the Court
addressed whether the "clearly erroneous" standard of review outlined in
the Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 10 limited appellate
review where the lower courts had applied the New York Times "actual
malice" standard.11 The Court held that it did not. 11 2 Instead, in cases in
which the Constitution provides the appropriate burden of proof at trial,
106. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964)
("[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and ... it must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need ... to
survive."' (alteration added) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963))).
107. See, e.g., id. at 279 ("A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions ... leads to a comparable 'self-
censorship."').
108. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
109. Id. at 487.
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). (setting out the standard of review on appeal for
findings of fact made by a judge sitting without a jury).
111. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 493.
112. Id. at 514.
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such as those applying the "actual malice" standard, judges must
independently and fully review the record on a case-by-case basis."
3
Justice Stevens wrote, "[t]his process has been vitally important in cases
involving restrictions on the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment."' 14  Independent review, not limited by the "clearly
erroneous" standard, "reflects a deeply held conviction that
judges ... must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious
liberties established and ordained by the Constitution."
5
Noted media attorney Lee Levine has argued that Bose stands
with New York Times and Gertz as one of the most important defamation
cases ever decided." 16 According to Levine, in Bose the Court attempted
to address "the growing incidence of defamation litigation and
debilitating jury verdicts by placing its imprimatur on the power of
appellate courts to reverse many such verdicts."' 1 7 The problem with
Bose, Levine argued, is that by focusing on appellate review, the Court
failed to address the "equally compelling necessity of judicial review
prior to trial."'"18
The Court attempted to deal with this very issue two years later
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.," 9 which involved a libel action
brought by a non-profit organization against a magazine and its publisher
for a series of articles that portrayed the organization as neo-Nazi.120 The
trial court in that case granted the publisher's motion for summary
judgment. 12  The issue before the Court was whether, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the trial judge should take into account
the standard of proof required for the underlying charge. 122 In this case,
because the standard of fault was "actual malice," the publisher argued
that the trial judge should consider at the summary judgment stage that at
113. Id. at 505.
114. Id at 503 (alteration added).
115. Id at 510-11.
116. Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation. Putting the Horse
Behind the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 3, 32 (1985).
117. Id. at38.
118. Id.
119. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
120. Id. at 244-45.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
122. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 244.
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trial the plaintiff would have to show "clear and convincing evidence" of
"actual malice."' 123 The Court agreed. Although its holding was not124thCorsadtt
specifically limited to First Amendment cases, the Court said that
"[w]hen determining if a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists
in a libel suit brought by a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind
the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability
under New York Times."' 25 In short, the Court made clear that in cases
involving the "actual malice" standard, the judge's assessment at the
summary judgment stage of whether there is a "genuine issue of material
fact"' 126 must take into account whether "a reasonable factfinder could
conclude ... that the plaintiff had shown actual malice with convincing
clarity. 127
Taken together, Bose and Liberty Lobby stand for the proposition
that in applying the Rules of Civil Procedure, judges must acknowledge
fundamental constitutional values.128  More specifically, when First
Amendment rights are at issue, courts may have to adjust their
enforcement of procedural rules to ensure that rights are protected. As a
result, the Court has broadly interpreted its ability, indeed its
responsibility, to guard, both at the summary judgment stage and beyond,
129
the rights of those commenting on public issues.
123. Id.
124. See id at 258 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 254 (majority opinion) (alterations added).
126. Id. at 248.
127. Id. at 252.
128. Id. at 254; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503
(1984).
129. It should be noted that Justice Rehnquist was a consistent critic of this
approach. He argued, in Liberty Lobby as well as in the earlier defamation case
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), that injecting First Amendment concerns into
procedural questions only confused the analysis of both. See, e.g., Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 ("We also reject
the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis.
The infusion of such considerations would needlessly complicate an already
imprecise inquiry.").
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IV. PULLING BACK FROM PRIEST V. SOBECK
The New York Times and Bose lines of cases leave little doubt
that fundamental First Amendment rights are implicated when
defendants in defamation cases involving speech on an issue of public
concern are forced to face trial. New York Times and its progeny made
clear that this speech is protected by the Constitution, and Bose and
Liberty Lobby confirmed that this protection is paramount, even in the
face of standards set by the Rules of Civil Procedure.
With these principles in mind, the outcome of Priest makes
perfect sense. It can hardly be argued, after all, that even though a core
constitutional right is implicated in cases involving speech on an issue of
public concern, there is no substantial right being infringed that might
justify an interlocutory appeal. And yet, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals in Neill Grading came to this very conclusion.
A. The Neill Grading Decision
Like Priest, Neill Grading involved the denial of a motion for
summary judgment made by the defendant-in this case a radio
broadcaster defending a defamation claim by a local contractor over
comments about a nearby sinkhole. 13  The Court of Appeals began its
analysis of the substantial right question by assessing whether, as the
defendant argued, the claim at issue "implicates the First Amendment
guarantees of the United States Constitution, falling outside the rubric of
North Carolina's general common law of defamation, and therefore
affects a substantial right.
' 131
In so doing, the court first had to decide what level of fault a
defamation plaintiff had to prove in North Carolina in cases involving a
private-figure plaintiff and an issue of public concern. In the court's
130. Neill Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 606 S.E.2d 734, 735 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005).
131. Id. at 738.
132. The court held that because the sinkhole had garnered such wide
attention, both in the area and nationally, it was clearly an issue of public concern.
See id. at 740-41. The court simply asserted, without analysis, that the plaintiff was
a private figure. See id at 740. This conclusion is at least debatable, given that the
plaintiff, a corporation, was a well-known contractor in the area with ample means
view, speech that warranted a greater degree of First Amendment
protection demanded a higher standard of fault and, therefore, implicated
a substantial right. 133  Reviewing the United States Supreme Court
defamation jurisprudence outlined above, the court said that two factors
control the level of fault required-whether the plaintiff is a public figure
or a private figure and whether the speech involved concerned an issue of
public concern or not.134 Where the plaintiff is a public official or public
figure, the standard of fault is clearly New York Times' "actual
malice."' 135 Where the plaintiff is a private figure and the speech does not
concern an issue of public concern, the court said, "a state court is free to
apply its governing common law without implicating First Amendment
concerns."' 136 Where, however, the plaintiff is a private figure but the
speech is about an issue of public concern, the United States Supreme
Court held that states can set their own level of fault, "'so long as they do
not impose liability without fault."1
37
The court balanced two separate state constitutional mandates,
the first in article I, section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution,
promising all citizens a legal remedy for "an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation,"'' 38 with the second in article I,
section 14, providing that "[f]reedom of speech and of the press are two
great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but
every person shall be held responsible for their abuse.' ' 139 In the court's
view, the balance was clear-"[o]f premier and fundamental interest to
the State of North Carolina is protecting the reputations of its citizens."
140
The court held that the standard of fault in North Carolina for speech
of responding to any falsehoods. In this case, for example, the company sent out a
press release responding to the charges in the radio report. Id. at 737.
133. Id. at 738.
134. Id. at 738-39 (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 774 (1986)).
135. Id. at 739 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-79
(1964)).
136. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985)).
137. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974)).
138. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18.
139. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 (alteration added).
140. Neill Grading, 606 S.E.2d at 741 (alteration added).
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involving an issue of public concern in a claim by a private figure
plaintiff is negligence. 141
With negligence as the standard, the court found little reason to
hear an interlocutory appeal based on the substantial right doctrine. The
court pointed out that summary judgment is rarely appropriate in
negligence cases, where juries typically are asked to apply the
"reasonable person" standard to the facts of the case. 142 Furthermore, in
what is clearly the key passage in the opinion, the court said that even
though the United States Supreme Court made clear:
that First Amendment protections supplant a state's
common law where the content is a matter of
public concern, we do not believe the
dissemination of information regarding a "private
individual" is of a kind benefitted [sic] by the
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" speech we
see promoted by the "actual malice" standard of
fault. 143
Having expressed its disapproval of the kind of speech at issue in
this case, the court said not only that it was not concerned about a
potential chilling effect, but, in fact, that this kind of speech should be
141. Id. Analysis of this holding is outside the scope of this Note. This is not
a controversial position, however. It is the majority rule across the country. See
Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3.3 (2d ed. 1994). At last count, six
states had elected to require plaintiffs in these cases to prove New York Times "actual
malice." See Robert D. Sack, 1 SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER & RELATED
PROBLEMS § 6.3 (3d ed. 1999). New York courts require plaintiffs to prove less than
"actual malice" but more than negligence. See id. at § 6.4. It is worthwhile to note,
at least, that the Court of Appeals essentially elevated one constitutional principle,
protection of reputation, above another, freedom of speech. This outcome is by no
means self-evident, and, in fact, a reasonable argument could be made that in light of
United States Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence and North Carolina Supreme
Court precedent on the articles in question the Court of Appeals was overprotective
of reputation. See, e.g., Corum v. Univ. of N.C. Through Bd. Of Gov., 413 S.E.2d
276, 289 (N.C. 1992) ("Certainly, the right of free speech should be protected at
least to the extent that individual rights to possession and use of property are
protected.").
142. Neill Grading, 606 S.E.2d at 742 (citing Williams v. Carolina Power &
Light Co., 250 S.E.2d 255, 257 (N.C. 1979)).
143. Id. (alteration added) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270-71 (1964)).
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W
chilled. 44 The court said, "[t]he negligence standard of fault does, and
we believe should, provide its own cooling and deliberative effect on the
kind of speech at issue in this case.' ' 145 This suggests that the court did
not believe that the defendant had a substantial right at issue at the
summary judgment stage that would justify an immediate appeal. 146 The
court said that given the negligence standard, as opposed to the New York
Times standard, "finding a substantial right . .. would not further any
First Amendment protection."' 147 On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme
Court at first granted discretionary review, 14 and then opted to dismiss
the appeal as "improvidently allowed."'
149
B. The Disconnect Between Priest and Neill Grading
Given the opportunity in Neill Grading to clarify the extent and
true meaning of its decision in Priest, the North Carolina Supreme Court
opted to punt, 150 leaving in place a Court of Appeals opinion that casts
considerable doubt on the actual reach of the substantial rights holding in
Priest.' 51 The key sentence in the Neill Grading opinion-recognizing
on the one hand that the First Amendment trumps the common law when
the speech is on an issue of public concern but deciding on the other that
the speech in question is not what the Court in New York Times and its
progeny envisioned152-seems at least internally inconsistent if not
outright defiant.
The point of the United States Supreme Court's consistent
rulings protecting potentially false speech on issues of public concern is
that they prevent judges and juries from punishing speech simply
144. Id.
145. Id. (alteration added) (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Neill Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 616 S.E.2d 541, 542 (N.C.
2005) (granting petition for discretionary review).
149. Neill Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 622 S.E.2d 490, 490 (N.C.
2005) (dismissing petition for discretionary review as "improvidently allowed").
150. See id.
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because they do not like its content. 53 Once the North Carolina Court of
Appeals recognized that the speech in Neill Grading involved an issue of
public concern, it no longer had the job of assessing whether the speech
deserved constitutional protection-it clearly does, even if that
protection is a negligence standard of fault rather than "actual malice."'
154
The North Carolina Supreme Court had already said in Priest that
forcing a defendant to go to trial to fight a defamation claim governed by
the "actual malice" standard infringes on a substantial right of the
defendant. 155  Given that the speech at issue in Neill Grading also
involved an issue of public concern, and therefore fell under the
constitutional umbrella-albeit at a lower standard of fault-it follows
that any ruling forcing the defendant to face a full defamation trial based
on the court's application of a constitutionally-proscribed standard would
similarly implicate a substantial right.
Yet, that is not how the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in
Neill Grading. The court, it appears, was unwilling to find a substantial
right at issue unless, as the dissent in Priest indicated, the trial court may
have misapplied the New York Times standard. 56 This reading of the
decision was confirmed several months after Neill Grading when the
same court dismissed an interlocutory appeal in Boyce & Isley i.1
5 7
There the court confirmed that "misapplication of the actual malice
standard on summary judgment could lead to some loss or infringement
on a substantial right.' , 158 Apparently, in the court's view, any case not
dealing strictly with the actual malice standard, even when the speech is
constitutionally protected, does not affect a substantial right.
In moving the speech in Neill Grading outside the realm of
constitutional protection, the Court of Appeals pointed to its need to
153. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
154. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986)
(holding that the Constitution requires at least a negligence standard of fault for
speech involving a private figure and an issue of public concern).
155. Priest v. Sobeck, 571 S.E.2d 75, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (Greene, J.,
dissenting) (alteration added), rev'd, 579 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 2003).
156. Priest, 571 S.E.2d at 81.
157. Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 611 S.E.2d 175, 178 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005).
158. Id.
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balance the state interest in protecting the reputation of its citizens.
159
This may have been the appropriate balance to strike in imposing a
negligence standard of fault, but in analyzing the substantial right issue,
the reputational interest is simply not relevant. The only state interest in
refusing to hear an interlocutory appeal is a generalized concern about
"procrastinat[ing] the administration of justice."'160 In many cases, this
state interest may well justify dismissal of an interlocutory appeal, but
when weighed against constitutionally-protected speech it likely does
not, especially in light of the principles outlined in the New York Times
and Bose lines of cases.
C. After Neill Grading-Closing the Floodgates
The North Carolina Court of Appeals' insistence in Neill
Grading on narrowly construing both state court precedent in Priest and
United States Supreme Court precedent in the New York Times and Bose
lines of cases marked more than an aberration. Within six months of
dismissing the interlocutory appeal in Neill Grading, the court dismissed
appeals of denials of a motion for judgment on the pleadings in Boyce
& Isley II and a motion to dismiss162 in Grant v. Miller.' While the
procedural differences between these two cases and Neill Grading, which
concerned a motion for summary judgment, are clearly important, Boyce
& Isley II and Miller are more compelling illustrations in some ways
because they involve pure political speech by candidates for public
office. In both cases, the losing candidate in an election claimed that
their opponents defamed them in a campaign advertisement.1
64
In Boyce & Isley II, the court rested its dismissal on a procedural
distinction. It distinguished between denial of summary judgment,
which means a full trial or a settlement will happen, and a denial of a
159. Neill Grading & Constr. Co. v. Lingafelt, 606 S.E.2d 734, 742 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005).
160. Id. at 741 (alteration added) (quoting Veazey v. City of Durham, 57
S.E.2d 377, 382 (N.C. 1950)).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-lA, Rule 12(c) (2005).
162. § 1-1A, Rule 12(b)(6).
163. 611 S.E.2d 477, 478-80 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
164. Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 611 S.E.2d 175, 176 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005); Grant, 611 S.E.2d at 478.
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motion for judgment on the pleadings, which "results in further
discovery and possibly summary judgment or other proceedings."'' 65 In a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court reasoned, the judge is
simply assessing whether the pleadings properly allege the elements of
the underlying claim, not assessing whether there is enough evidence
forecast to sustain that claim. 166 In this case the court, in ruling on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, had not actually applied the
"actual malice" standard, it had simply assessed whether the plaintiff had
properly alleged in his claim that defendant had defamed him with
"actual malice."'167 Because the trial judge had not literally had to apply
the "actual malice" standard to the case, the Court of Appeals said, Priest
was inapplicable.
168
Just a month after Boyce & Isley II, the court decided essentially
the same issue in Miller. Miller was an appeal of the trial court's denial
of a motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals said that such a motion
is "more akin to a [North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings than a motion for summary judgment.' 69
Because the issues in Miller and Boyce & Isley II were
"indistinguishable," the court said it was bound by the precedent in
Boyce & Isley IH.170
While the rule announced in Boyce & Isley II and followed in
Miller certainly reflects a valid reading of Priest, it is without question
the narrowest reading possible. More importantly, it seems to ignore the
broader First Amendment principles outlined by the United States
Supreme Court since New York Times. In essence, the court announced
in Boyce & Isley H that it chose to interpret Priest as applying only
where (1) the standard in question is "actual malice," and (2) that
standard has been actually applied to the facts of the case, or at least to
the forecast evidence. Thus, where the standard of fault is negligence,
even for speech on an issue of public concern as in Neill Grading, there




169. Grant, 611 S.E.2d at 479 (alteration added).
170. Id. (citing In re Appeal from Civil Penalty, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (N.C.
1989)).
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is no substantial right at issue. 17 1 This despite the fact that the United
States Supreme Court made clear in the New York Times line of cases
that any speech on an issue of public concern warrants First Amendment
protection, even if the standard is negligence and not "actual malice."'
72
Furthermore, unless the "actual malice" standard has been actually
applied to the case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals said, there is no
substantial right at issue. 173 Left unanswered by the court is the question
of whether a substantial right is infringed where the trial court applies a
negligence standard even though the defendant asserts that the standard
ought to be "actual malice." By its narrow reading of Priest, the Court of
Appeals seems to be indicating that such a case would not implicate a
substantial right because the trial court did not literally "misappl[y]
the. . . 'actual malice' standard," 174 but rather did not apply it at all.
As the Court of Appeals itself pointed out in Boyce & Isley II, its
understanding of the scope of Priest is greatly complicated by the fact
that the North Carolina Supreme Court has chosen to give no guidance,
aside from its per curiam adoption of Judge Greene's Priest dissent.
175
The four sentences of that dissent dealing with the substantial right
issue 176are hardly enough to help courts assess whether substantial rights
are implicated in First Amendment cases. Faced with a paucity of
guidance from the state Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals has chosen
to adopt a literalist reading of Judge Greene's dissent-that it only
applies where the "actual malice" standard has been applied wrongly. 177
Given three chances-in Neill Grading, Boyce & Isley II, and Miller-to
clarify the intersection of substantial rights appeals and the First
Amendment, or at least fully explain the meaning of Priest, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has refused every time.
The result of the Court of Appeals' narrow reading of Priest, and
the Supreme Court's refusal to broaden it, has been to confirm the fears
171. Boyce & Isley, 611 S.E.2d at 178-79.
172. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775
(1986).
173. Boyce & Isley, 611 S.E.2d at 178.
174. Priest v. Sobeck, 571 S.E.2d 75, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (Greene, J.,
dissenting) (alteration added), rev 'd, 579 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 2003).
175. Boyce &Isley, 611 S.E.2d at 178.
176. See supra note 61.
177. Priest, 571 S.E.2d at 81 (Greene, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 5
2007] SINKHOLES AND "SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS" 333
of the United States Supreme Court, expressed in New York Times, that
commentary on issues of public concern might be chilled by the prospect
of expensive litigation.' 78 Boyce & Isley has been making its way
through the courts for six years, 179 Neill Grading for four years, and
Miller for three. 18  Neill Grading is particularly illustrative. The final
result of the four-year journey through North Carolina's courts in that
case was a two-day trial that ended with the plaintiff taking a voluntary
dismissal.
181
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
While North Carolina, in the wake of Neill Grading, seems to
have tipped the balance in favor of judicial economy at the expense of
providing First Amendment rights with additional protection, a survey of
how other states have addressed the issue of interlocutory appeals in
defamation cases shows a deeply divided legal landscape. 82 According
to research compiled by the Media Law Resource Center, thirteen states
either do not allow any interlocutory appeals at all or have never
addressed the question specifically. 83  Nineteen other states allow
interlocutory appeals, but have not yet had a case forcing them to decide
whether such an appeal is allowed in circumstances like Neill Grading.'84
Three states, Arkansas, Texas, and New York, have some sort of
178. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
179. Matthew Eisley, Boyce Sues Cooper Over Negative Ads, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Nov. 9, 2000, at A20.
180. Lynn Bonner, Congressman Named in Lawsuit, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Jan. 22, 2003, at B5.
181. Telephone interview with Clerk of Court of Catawba County, in Newton,
N.C. (Oct. 25, 2006) (notes on file with author). The parties announced at trial that
they had reached a settlement.
182. See generally Media Libel Law 2005-06, supra note 17 (surveying state
statutory and case law on various aspects of defamation claims, including
availability of interlocutory appeals).
183. Id. Those thirteen are Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and
West Virginia.
184. Id. Those nineteen are Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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statutory provision that would allow such appeals. 185 Fourteen states
have precedents specifically allowing interlocutory appeals in these kinds
of cases.'86
Perhaps the simplest way to bring some uniformity to this area of
the law, suggested by Professor Gilles, is to craft a rule allowing appeals
of denial of summary judgment in defamation cases.187  Given the
statistics cited by Gilles, 88 an immediate appeal, which would more
often than not result in a reversal, would end up "saving plaintiffs,
defendants, and the public, the cost of a trial."' 89 Of course, in those
cases in which the trial court did correctly rule on summary judgment,
this interlocutory appeal would result in increased delay and cost for both
parties,' 9° but, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in Hepps, "where the
scales are in an uncertain balance, we believe that the Constitution
requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech."' 9'
In any case, Gilles argues, several factors should tip the balance
in favor of interlocutory appeals. First, the cost of an interlocutory
appeal would still be less than the cost of a trial, so the small chance of
an unnecessary appeal seems justified.192 Second, Gilles believes, this
sort of rule would affect a small number of cases, because parties already
have a right to an interlocutory appeal when summary judgment is
granted. 193 Finally, whatever increased cost might result from a few
unnecessary appeals must be weighed against the fundamental First
Amendment principle that is harmed by a large number of erroneous pro-
185. Id.
186. Id. Those fourteen are Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Utah, and Washington. Because Priest is still technically good law, North Carolina
probably best fits in this category, but the sturdiness of that precedent is certainly
questionable. See infra Part IV.
187. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1802. See also Richard N. Winfield,
Interlocutory Appeals as of Right: The Time Has Come, 17 COMM. LAW. 18-19
(Spring 1999) (analyzing the success of the Texas statute granting interlocutory
appeals to media defendants in defamation cases).
188. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
189. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1802.
190. Id.
191. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
192. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1802.
193. Id. at 1802-03.
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plaintiff lower court decisions. 194 As Gilles points out, 195 New York's
interlocutory appeal statute allows interlocutory appeals of denial of
summary judgment.' 96 Between 1986 and 1994, Gilles says, more than
ninety percent of interlocutory appeals of denials of summary judgment
resulted in either a full reversal or a partial reversal.
97
Texas has adopted a slightly narrower approach to this issue.
The Texas statute outlining appeals of interlocutory orders contains a
specific provision granting interlocutory appeal to any media defendant
denied summary judgment.198 The statute reads:
A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of
a district court, county court at law, or county court
that... (6) denies a motion for summary judgment
that is based in whole or in part upon a claim
against or defense by a member of the electronic or
print media, acting in such capacity, or a person
whose communication appears in or is published
by the electronic or print media, arising under the
free speech or free press clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, or
Article I, Section 8, of the Texas
Constitution .... 199
The only limit imposed by the statute is that if the interlocutory
order is affirmed on appeal, the media defendant must pay the costs and
attorney's fees of the plaintiff. 20 This approach has been quite
successful in weeding out lower court errors before forcing media
defendants to go through a long trial. 20 By one count, in 1998 alone,
194. Id. at 1803.
195. Id. at 1803-04.
196. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701(a)(2)(vi) (1999).
197. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1804 (citing LDRC SJ Update, Appendix G). It
should be noted, as Gilles does, that these numbers may be slightly skewed by New
York's heightened fault standard in private figure libel cases and by its extremely
low rate of summary judgment grants at the trial level. Id. at 1804 n.204.
198. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(6) (2005).
199. Id.
200. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.015 (2005).
201. See, e.g., K-Six Television, Inc. v. Santiago, 75 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. App.
2002) (reversing denial of summary judgment); Galveston Newspapers, Inc. v.
Norris, 981 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App. 1998) (reversing denial of summary judgment);
Texas appellate courts reversed six of seven appeals of denials of
202
summary judgment. The virtue of the Texas statute is that its limited
applicability eliminates significant concerns about judicial efficiency that
would come with a statute that simply allows interlocutory appeals of
denials of summary judgment with no limitation as to the type of
• • 203
defendant or claim. The question is whether it is underinclusve. The
United States Supreme Court has never limited its defamation
jurisprudence to media defendants, choosing instead to focus on the
204
speech involved. A strict reading of the Texas statute would seem to
eliminate from its protection commentary on public issues or public
officials that does not appear in the print or electronic media, like, for
example, the lone protester on the capitol steps or the political candidate
issuing a campaign advertisement.
In other states that share North Carolina's more restrictive
interlocutory appeals statute, the solution has been left to the courts
rather than the legislature. In some such jurisdictions, courts have
chosen to strike the balance between judicial efficiency and the First
Amendment in favor of the First Amendment. In Arizona, in a case
involving a private-figure plaintiff and speech concerning an issue of
public concern, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of
• 205
the newspaper defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court
acknowledged at the outset that review "of a trial court's denial of
summary judgment is a rarity and shall remain so. ' 20 6  The court
continued:
We make an exception in this case in furtherance
of the public's significant first amendment interest
cf TSM AM-FM TV v. Meca Homes, Inc., 969 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App. 1998)
(affirming denial of summary judgment).
202. Winfield, supra note 187, at 19.
203. See, e.g., Quebe v. Pope, 201 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. App. 2006) (dismissing
interlocutory appeal and holding that the Texas statute applied to non-media
defendants only if the statement in question were published in the media).
204. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) ("We think that [New York
Times and other previous defamation decisions] are correct, but we do not find their
holdings justified solely by reference to the interest of the press and broadcast media
in immunity from liability." (alteration added)).
205. Scottsdale Publ., Inc. v. Superior Court, 764 P.2d 1131 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988).
206. Id. at 1133.
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in protecting the press from the chill of meritless
actions.
The absence of merit in plaintiffs case is
plain. By taking jurisdiction at this stage, we
relieve the parties and the court of a prolonged,
costly, and inevitably futile trial; additionally, and
more significantly, we relieve the [defendant] of a
potential chilling of its future reporting on
activities of organized crime.2 °7
California courts have adopted a similar philosophy. In a libel
case where the defendant moved for summary judgment because, it
argued, the retractions it printed immunized it from liability, the
appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion.20 8 Here
again, the court struck the balance in favor of the First Amendment. It
said, "This question must be examined with special care, for in libel
cases a court's failure to summarily adjudicate factual issues not in
material dispute inflicts an unnecessary burden on the strong public
interest in journalistic freedom.,
20 9
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. Twin Coast Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 656
(1989).
209. Id. at 662. See also Cox Enter., Inc. v. Bakin, 426 S.E.2d 651, 651 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1992) (granting interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment in libel
case); Jones v. Palmer Commc'ns., Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Iowa 1989) (granting
interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment in libel case); Romero v.
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 648 So.2d 866, 870 (La. 1995) (reversing trial court's
denial of summary judgment in libel claim involving an issue of public concern.
The court said: "Summary judgment is favored in defamation cases because lengthy
litigation could have a chilling effect on freedom of the press."); Aldoupolis v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 500 N.E.2d 794 (Mass. 1986) (reversing denial of summary
judgment in a libel case involving an issue of public concern); Spreen v. Smith, 394
N.W.2d 123, 124 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing denial of summary judgment in
public official libel case); Rye v. Seattle Times Co., 678 P.2d 1282, 1283-84 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1984) (granting interlocutory appeal of denial of summary judgment in libel
action). C.f News-Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166, 167-68 (Del. 1967)
(reversing denial of summary judgment where trial court misapplied the New York
Times standard of fault); Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003) (reversing trial
court discovery order which would have required defendant web site writers to
reveal their identities to the plaintiff but refusing to hold that any allegation of a
constitutional violation renders an interlocutory order appealable); Pendleton v. Utah
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW
While there are clear alternative approaches for summary
judgment cases like Neill Grading, cases like Boyce & Isley and Miller
involving Rule 12 motions pose a trickier problem. Unlike the Gilles
proposal or the Texas statute, the approaches taken by states like Arizona
and California can, when circumstances require, be stretched to cover
situations like Boyce & Isley H and Miller. To be sure, there are strong
arguments for not hearing appeals of denials of motions to dismiss. The
defendant, after all, can still file a later motion for summary judgment-
and appeal a denial of that motion if allowed-before being forced to go
to trial.2 1 These arguments, however, fail to account for the sometimes
massive expense of discovery imposed on defendants when their motions
to dismiss are denied.1  Insofar as a defamation claim is flawed from
the outset, it seems clear that requiring a defendant to pay for a lengthy
discovery and deposition process would impermissibly chill protected
212
speech in the same way that a full trial would. Where jurisdictions
adopt the Arizona and California view of how to balance First
Amendment rights and judicial efficiency, courts would at least have the
option to review denial of motions to dismiss defamation claims that are
clearly deficient.
If, however, courts are not willing to broaden their view of
interlocutory appeals in defamation cases, statutory change may be
needed. While the Texas statute is an interesting model, the approach
favored by Gilles would be a better balance. Such a statute, limited to
claims arising under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, or under the free speech or free press clauses of state
213constitutions, would still protect judicial administration but be more
inclusive than the Texas statute in its protection of speech.
State Bar, 16 P.3d 1230, 1231 (Utah 2000) (reversing denial of motion to dismiss
defamation action).
210. See Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 611 S.E.2d 175, 178 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005).
211. See Gilles, supra note 64, at 1782-83.
212. See id. at 1803 n.199.
213. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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CONCLUSION
While none of the approaches outlined here are perfect, they all
seem more faithful to the First Amendment vision laid out by Justice
Brennan in New York Times. There is unquestionably a balance to be
struck between allowing repeated and futile appeals to "procrastinate the
administration of justice"'2 14 and giving speech the "breathing space" it
215
needs to survive. Priest hinted that the North Carolina Supreme Court
was attempting to strike this balance by erring on the side of the First
Amendment, a balance seemingly in accordance with United States
216Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has chosen to read Priest as narrowly as
possible, refusing to apply it except in summary judgment cases where
• 217
the "actual malice" standard has been wrongly applied. This reading is
overly solicitous of concerns about judicial efficiency, especially in light
of statistics showing that trial courts and juries usually get the law wrong
218in defamation cases. It has been amply demonstrated elsewhere
around the country that either by statute-as in New York and Texas--or
by judicial interpretation, courts have been able to spare defamation
defendants the expense and time of defending themselves from claims
219that are impaired from the outset.
It is long past time for the North Carolina Supreme Court to
clarify its holding in Priest. If the Court of Appeals' reading of that
decision is indeed overly narrow, the Supreme Court should correct it.
If, however, the Supreme Court agrees with that reading, then statutory
change may be appropriate. A statute granting interlocutory appeals of
all denials of summary judgment could be over-inclusive at the expense
of efficiency. Limiting this provision, however, to defamation claims
would be narrow enough to keep frivolous interlocutory appeals out of
214. Veazey v. City of Durham, 57 S.E.2d 377, 382 (N.C. 1950).
215. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
216. Priest v. Sobeck, 579 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 2003).
217. See Priest v. Sobeck, 571 S.E.2d 75, 81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (Greene, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 579 S.E.2d 250 (N.C. 2003).
218. Gilles, supra note 64, at 1781-82.
219. See supra Part V.
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the courts while tipping the scales in favor of the First Amendment.
220
More importantly, it would bring some semblance of order and clarity to
the substantial rights doctrine in North Carolina, which, until now, has
,221been "a disorganized display of case law."
220. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986)
("Where the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we believe that the Constitution
requires us to tip them in favor of protecting true speech.") (alteration in footnote
added).
221. Whichard, supra note 31, at 125.
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